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Abstract—Being very resilient devices, smart cards have been 
commonly used for two-factor authentication schemes. However, 
the possibility of side-channel attacks renders private data stored 
in the cards vulnerable to compromise. With this in mind, we 
propose an authentication protocol that incorporates a second 
factor, which is as a password, in addition to the smart card. The 
scheme is aimed to withstand most common security breaches as 
well as compromised smart card scenarios and offline dictionary 
attacks on the passwords. Details of a reference implementation 
are also given along with performance evaluation of the proposed 
protocol comparing to the literature. Performance analyses show 
that the proposed protocol outperforms existing solutions in the 
literature. Moreover, the computational cost of the proposed 
protocol is less than 2 seconds on our reference implementation 
that uses commercially available smart cards.  
Keywords—Two-factor Authentication; Remote Login; Smart 
Card; Offline Dictionary Attack; Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Online services have been more and more prevalent in daily 
life. Internet users use remote servers all around the world to 
store their information, even private information. As a standard 
security measure, remote servers are expected to deny access to 
users that fail identification and authentication processes. The 
authentication usually depends on a pre-determined password 
that only the legitimate user is supposed to know. This 
introduces single point of vulnerability to whole mechanism. In 
the event that the password is compromised, the remote server 
will not be able to deny access to imposters. To remedy this, 
two-factor authentication protocols have been devised. In this 
paper, we propose such a protocol that utilizes passwords and 
smart cards together.  Our protocol is a robust one such that it 
resists card stealing attacks or offline password guessing 
attacks. 
In recent years, many different smart card based 
authentication schemes have been proposed [3, 5, 6, 7, 8]. 
Some of these protocols have been developed as an 
improvement to a previous protocol that has been found out to 
be insecure or inefficient [9, 10, 11]. Later, some of the 
improved protocols have been shown to have security issues 
themselves and enhanced versions of previously improved 
schemes have been brought to attention [12]. This long chain of 
design issues and solutions has shown that the security of an 
algorithm or a scheme depends heavily upon the security of the 
components that is built on.  
Smart cards have been known to be safe to store private 
information, thus have been a trusted tool in two-factor 
authentication designs. However, side-channel attacks [1, 2] on 
smart cards have broken the assumption that the contents of a 
smart card are externally inaccessible. Since then, the protocols 
that relied on the card to store sensitive information have been 
found out to be weak against offline dictionary attacks on 
stolen smart cards. Offline dictionary attacks are possible to 
launch, since the password space is usually small for efficiency 
(easy to remember, easy to type). We accept the possibility that 
data stored in a smart card is extractable. On the other hand, we 
still assume that a random number generated on-the-fly cannot 
be revealed; otherwise the device would not be different than a 
white box. We base our protocol on this assumption, thereby, 
do not store any sensitive information on the card and use the 
card in the process of generating random numbers and utilizing 
them in the protocol run. Moreover, we aim that our proposed 
protocol would be (i) lightweight, (ii) resisting against common 
security attacks such as offline dictionary and replay attacks, 
(iii) feasible to be implemented on commercially available 
smart cards with standard features and capabilities. Our 
protocol is based on other Elliptic Curve based schemes [3, 5, 
6]. The key difference between our protocol and previously 
presented ones is that our protocol is simpler, and operation-
wise is comparable with other protocols. Additionally, we 
provide a reference implementation with actual timings of a run 
of the protocol. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next 
section (Section II), we give the details of our proposed robust 
authentication protocol. Section III covers security analysis of 
the proposed protocol. This analysis includes most of the 
common security attacks and how the proposed protocol is 
supposed to thwart them. Consecutively in Section IV, details 
of a reference implementation are presented. Runtime 
measurements of the implementation are given in Section V 
and finally Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. OUR PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
The proposed protocol aims to authenticate users to a 
remote server via smart cards. A user is assumed to have a 
unique ID, a password and a smart card. At the registration 
phase, which is performed only once, the user (the terms client 
and user are used interchangeably) and the server agree on 
multiple parameters while exchanging messages over a secure 
channel. When a client wishes to log in (authenticate) to the 
remote server, not only ID and the password should be known, 
but the smart card should also be present. Upon receiving ID, 
password pair; the smart card and the server communicates to 
verify each other. If the verification is successful and the user is 
authentic, then both sides can calculate a secret key that is 
supposed to be the same on both ends. The secret key can be 
utilized for further secure communication and the protocol ends 
after the derivation of the symmetric key. 
A. Elliptic Curve (EC) and EC Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) 
In this subsection, the well-known Elliptic Curve (EC) 
concept and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol 
are overviewed.  
 EC is a curve defined by an equation of the form: 
𝑦2  =  𝑥3  +  𝑎𝑥 +  𝑏
where 𝑎 and 𝑏 are real numbers. ECDH is a key agreement 
scheme that allows two parties to generate a secret value over 
public channel. ECDH depends on the idea that it is very hard 
or infeasible to solve EC Discrete Logarithm Problem 
(ECDLP): given two points 𝑃 and 𝑄 on the curve such that 
𝑄 =  𝑘. 𝑃.  
 In ECDH, both parties select their random secret values, 
(𝑘1  and 𝑘2) and perform multiplication on the same point (𝑃). 
𝑄1 =  𝑘1. 𝑃 
𝑄2 =  𝑘2. 𝑃 
 
Then, they exchange 𝑄1 and 𝑄2. After the exchange, they 
calculate the shared secret as follows. 
𝑆1  =  𝑘1. 𝑄2 
𝑆2  =  𝑘2. 𝑄2 
 
In our protocol, ECDH key agreement scheme will be used 
to create a temporary shared key in the login phase of the 
authentication protocol. 
B. Registration Phase 
The communication in this phase is assumed to be over a 
secure channel. The user, 𝑢𝑖 determines a unique 𝐼𝐷𝑖 and a 
password 𝑃𝑊𝑖 . These are the inputs to the smart card. In the 
card, a random number,  𝑏, is generated and this number is kept 
secret throughout the lifetime of the card. 
The server generates a secret random number, 𝑠, in the 
registration phase of the first user of the system. The same 
number is kept as server's secret and used for the remaining 
users that will register later. The server also chooses an elliptic 
curve, 𝐸𝐶, a symmetric cipher algorithm 𝐶(∙) and a secure 
hash function 𝐻(∙) as system parameters. 
The flow of registration phase is given in Fig. 1. In this 
phase, the user sends 𝐼𝐷𝑖  to the server. Upon receiving 𝐼𝐷𝑖, the 
server checks if the ID is in use by another user. If the received 
ID is not unique, the registration phase is terminated. 
In the reply message, the server specifies hash and 
encryption functions to be used for the entirety of the 
authentication protocol.  
The user creates a large secret random number 𝑏 and 
concatenates this number with the password and finally hashes 
it. The output of the hash operation is sent to the server. 
Meanwhile, user stores 𝑏, 𝐸𝐶, 𝐶(∙) together with her ID in the 
smart card, 𝑆𝐶. 
Obtaining the hash from the user, the server hashes its 
secret s concatenated with client’s 𝐼𝐷𝑖 then applies XOR 
operation with the hash received from the user. Finally, the 
result 𝐴𝑖, is stored along with 𝐼𝐷𝑖  on the server side. 
If the user wants to change the password, then a secure 
channel should be reestablished. This can be achieved by 
following the protocol and reaching to a shared session key 
between the user and the server. The user 𝑢𝑖 creates a fresh 
random number 𝑏𝑛𝑒𝑤 and sends this number along with 
𝐻(𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑑||𝑃𝑊𝑜𝑙𝑑) and 𝑃𝑊𝑛𝑒𝑤  to the server. The server 
recalculates 𝐴𝑖 and then replaces the old value with the newly 
calculated value. 
𝐴𝑖
′ = 𝐴𝑖 ⊕ 𝐻(𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑑||𝑃𝑊𝑜𝑙𝑑) ⊕ 𝐻(𝑏𝑛𝑒𝑤||𝑃𝑊𝑛𝑒𝑤) 
If the server needs to perform key rotation, i.e. change the 
secret number 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑  with 𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑤 , then all 𝐴𝑖 must be recalculated 
as shown, 
𝐴𝑖
′ = 𝐴𝑖 ⊕ 𝐻(𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑||𝐼𝐷𝑖) ⊕ 𝐻(𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑤||𝐼𝐷𝑖) 
 
Fig. 1. Registration Phase 
C. Login Preparation Phase 
During login, the communication channel is considered to 
be insecure. The login is done in two phases: (i) login 
preparation and (ii) verification phases. The first one, login 
preparation phase is depicted in Fig. 2. The user 𝑢𝑖 provides 
𝐼𝐷𝑖  and 𝑃𝑊𝑖  to the smart card. A random point 𝑃 in 𝐸𝐶 is 
chosen together with a random number 𝑑𝑢. 𝑄𝑢 is calculated by 
multiplying 𝑃 with 𝑑𝑢, and sent to the server with 𝑃. The 
server chooses a random 𝑑𝑠 and calculates 𝑄𝑠 by multiplying 𝑃 
with 𝑑𝑠 and a shared key 𝑆𝐾 by multiplying 𝑄𝑢 with 𝑑𝑠. Client 
sends her ID and a timestamp encrypting it with freshly created 
𝑆𝐾. The server decrypts this message and this concludes the 
login preparation phase of the protocol.  
D. Verification Phase 
Verification phase, shown in Fig. 3, is the actual phase that 
the client is authenticated to the server. At this phase, the server 
and client switches to a modified version of the shared key that 
they generated in the previous phase. This new key is 
calculated as shown below. 
𝑆𝐾′ =  𝑆𝐾 ⊕ 𝐻(𝑏 || 𝑃𝑊𝑖) 
User 𝒖𝒊 Server 
selects 𝐼𝐷𝑖 
selects 𝑃𝑊𝑖 
secret number: 𝑠 
Elliptic Curve: 𝐸𝐶 
 𝐼𝐷𝑖 
Cipher: 𝐶(∙) 
Hash function: 𝐻(∙)  
𝐻(∙) and 𝐶(∙) 
𝐻(𝑏 || 𝑃𝑊𝑖) 
𝐴𝑖 = 𝐻(𝑏 || 𝑃𝑊𝑖) ⊕ 𝐻(𝑠 || 𝐼𝐷𝑖) 
(𝐼𝐷𝑖 , 𝐴𝑖) is stored 
picks random 𝑏 
𝑆𝐶 ← {𝐼𝐷𝑖 , 𝐸𝐶, 𝐶(∙), 𝑏}  
With the help of this new key, the server sends an 
encrypted random challenge to the user and expects to see the 
same value in the next message from the user. In addition to 
responding to server's challenge, client puts its own random 
challenge in the same message. Naturally, the client will 
authenticate the server, if the server can successfully respond to 
the challenge. Responses of the challenges (messages 5 and 6) 
will have their own timestamps in order to prevent replay 
attacks. 
 
Fig. 2. Login Preparation Phase 
 
Fig. 3. Verification Phase 
After the end of the verification phase, if both parties make 
sure about the identity of each other, they are individually able 
to calculate the same session key as show below. This session 
key can be used to secure further communication.  
𝐾𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛  =  𝐻( 𝑆𝐾′ || 𝐻 (𝑐𝑐 ⊕  𝑠𝑐) || 𝑇𝑆2 || 𝑇𝑆3 ) 
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
We assume that the adversary, denoted with A in the 
subsequent discussions, has full control of the communication 
channel. Therefore, the attacker can eavesdrop, block, modify 
and inject packets into the insecure channel. 
The second assumption is that the hash function we used is 
a cryptographically secure one-way hash function. It has pre-
image resistance property so that it is not easy to find the input 
of the function by analyzing its output. Moreover, the 
symmetric cipher used is a computationally secure one. 
Third assumption is that the attacker may compromise only 
one of the two components: smart card or password. This 
assumption is a reasonable one since if one obtains both, then 
he/she has all the credentials that a legitimate user has.  
In the following subsections, we discuss possible security 
threats and how they are prevented.  
A. Offline Dictionary Attack  
Offline password guessing is a type of attack scenario in 
which the adversary A has the control over the smart card of 𝑢𝑖. 
A can extract secret information from the card, which is the 
user's secret random number 𝑏. Then, in order to complete the 
attack, 𝐴 must learn 𝑃𝑊 by trying possible passwords from a 
dictionary in offline manner using the protocol messages. In 
order to obtain the protocol messages, A can either 
1. observe captured messages from previous runs of 
protocol, or 
2. initiate a new run with the server and try to find more 
from the incoming message. 
In both cases, 𝐴 first tries to obtain 𝐻(𝑏 || 𝑃𝑊), which is equal 
to 𝑆𝐾′ ⊕  𝑆𝐾. Then, 𝐴 launches a brute force attack on 
H(b || PW) by trying different PW′ values from the dictionary 
until he finds a correct PW′ such that, 𝐻(𝑏 || 𝑃𝑊′)  =
 𝐻(𝑏 || 𝑃𝑊). 
In the first case mentioned above, A has a bunch of 
messages which were encrypted with either 𝑆𝐾 or  𝑆𝐾′. In this 
case, 𝐴 needs to find out both 𝑆𝐾 and 𝑆𝐾′ in order to obtain a 
test base (i.e. 𝐻(𝑏 || 𝑃𝑊)) for password guessing. However, 
she does not know 𝑆𝐾 since she did not initiate the previous 
protocol runs. 𝐴 can try to find out 𝑆𝐾 only by trying to break 
ECDH messages of the corresponding login preparation phase. 
However, this requires the attacker to solve ECDLP problem, 
which is computationally infeasible. For learning 𝑆𝐾′, A only 
has messages, which are encryptions of random numbers. 
These do not help her either since we assume the use of secure 
symmetric ciphers. Thus we conclude that without 𝑆𝐾 and 𝑆𝐾′, 
A cannot launch an offline dictionary attack. 
For the second case mentioned above, A initiates a protocol 
run with the server and they calculate 𝑆𝐾 during the login 







𝑄𝑢 = 𝑃 . 𝑑𝑢 
enters 𝐼𝐷𝑖and 𝑃𝑊𝑖 
random 𝑃 in 𝐸𝐶 
random 𝑑𝑢  
𝐻(𝑏 || 𝑃𝑊𝑖) = 𝐴𝑖 ⊕ 𝐻(𝑠 || 𝐼𝐷𝑖) 
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random 𝑑𝑠 
checks 𝐻(𝑠𝑐) = 𝐻(𝑠𝑐′) 
𝑃 and 𝑄𝑢 
𝐸𝑆𝐾(𝑠𝑐) 
𝐷𝑆𝐾(𝐼𝐷𝑖  || 𝑇𝑆1) 
checks 𝑇𝑆1 




𝑆𝐾 =  𝑄𝑠 . 𝑑𝑢 
𝑆𝐾′ = 𝑆𝐾 ⊕ 𝐻(𝑏 || 𝑃𝑊𝑖) 
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′) || 𝑇𝑆2) 
3. 
𝐷𝑆𝐾′(𝐸𝑆𝐾′(𝑐𝑐 || 𝐻(𝑠𝑐
′) || 𝑇𝑆2)) 
𝐸𝑆𝐾′(𝐻(𝑐𝑐
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𝐷𝑆𝐾′(𝐸𝑆𝐾′(𝐻(𝑐𝑐
′) || 𝑇𝑆3)) 




renames decrypted 𝑐𝑐 as 𝑐𝑐′  
verification phase. Message 4 contains 𝐸𝑆𝐾′(𝑠𝑐). 𝐴 can try to 
calculate 𝑆𝐾′ by trying different 𝑃𝑊′ values by checking the 
equality  𝑆𝐾′ =  𝑆𝐾 ⊕ 𝐻(𝑏 ||𝑃𝑊′). Then for each 𝑆𝐾′, 𝐴 can 
decrypt message 4 to find 𝑠𝑐. However, since 𝑠𝑐 is a random 
number, A cannot be sure that the decrypted value is equal to 
𝑠𝑐. Thus A cannot make sure that the correct value of 𝑆𝐾′ is 
found. Thus, the attacker 𝐴 is enforced to stop the protocol 
after message 4. One might argue that 𝐴 may take her chance 
to generate a trial message 5 with the candidate 𝑠𝑐 and 
corresponding 𝑆𝐾′. This can be tried, but the probability of 
success is the same as the probability of success of one trial of 
regular brute force attack, which is extremely small. Moreover, 
the attacker cannot try again with the same 𝑆𝐾 since after 
refusal of message 5 by the server, the protocol will start over 
with a different 𝑆𝐾. 
B. Replay Attacks 
An adversary may choose to replay any previously sent 
message in the protocol runs. Replaying message 1 from an 
older session yields no result, since the server will most 
probably choose a different elliptic curve point and therefore 
will create a different 𝑆𝐾. Similarly, replaying an older 
message 2 to client will still result in a different 𝑆𝐾 being 
created. 
Since the client and the server choose generates different 
elliptic curve points at each run, 𝑆𝐾 will be different as well. 
Replay of message 3 will not be decrypted correctly at the 
server side and will not be of any advantage to the adversary 
since the server will reject due to incorrect 𝐼𝐷𝑖 . In the same 
sense, replaying messages 4, 5 or 6 will not benefit the 
attacker, because different 𝑆𝐾 at each iteration of the protocol 
leads to different 𝑆𝐾’; therefore, the server will notice any 
discrepancy at the event of incorrect decryption.  
C. Impersonation Attacks 
Impersonation attacks happen when 𝐴 successfully 
authenticates herself as either client or server to the other side. 
1) Client Impersonation 
 A legitimate user requires a smart card, an ID and a 
password to log in. We do not focus on protecting the ID of the 
user, because users tend to select IDs that are not supposed to 
be private. The password and the smart card, however, should 
only be in possession of the user. In the situation that both the 
password and the card are compromised at the same time, 𝐴 
has everything required to authenticate as the real user. There is 
no way to prevent impersonation in this scenario, so we assume 
that A can only obtain one of these two, as discussed at the 
beginning of Section III. 
If 𝐴 knows the password, but does not have the smart card, 
then she cannot calculate 𝑆𝐾′ in the verification phase. She 
needs to know 𝐻(𝑏 || 𝑃𝑊𝑖) and for this, client's secret 𝑏 should 
be known. However, this secret number is stored only in the 
smart card. 
If 𝐴 has the smart card, but does not have the password, she 
can still get past the login phase. Since the password space 
could be small, 𝐴 may want to try all possible 𝑃𝑊𝑖  until 
successfully authenticated. This can be thwarted easily by 
employing a mechanism on the server side to lock down the 
IDs of users with a number of unsuccessful login attempts. 
Another approach 𝐴 may want to take is to try and guess 𝑆𝐾′ 
then retrace from that point to find 𝐻(𝑏 || 𝑃𝑊𝑖). This attempt 
is futile since the message sent by the server (message 4) is 
highly entropic, because it is an encryption of a random 
number. The adversary may not know if he tries the correct 
key, since the decryption does not produce a "meaningful" 
result anyway. 
2) Server Impersonation 
In this section, we consider that the adversary 𝐴 is a third 
party trying to impersonate server. Similar to the previous 
scenario, 𝐴 can get past the login phase with ease. However, 
since H(b||PW) is unknown, A cannot resume the protocol by 
calculating SK′. 
In another scenario, adversary may steal the card, extract 𝑏 
from the card, and place it back without the user gets noticed. 
In this case, when the user initiates the authentication process, 
the adversary may interrupt and try to impersonate the server. 
This attempt fails when client sends message 5. Since 𝐴 cannot 
decrypt it since she does not know SK′, client will not get the 
response (message 6) and the protocol will fail.  
IV. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
We implemented the proposed protocol using a 
commercially available smart card (Feitian A22CR) over Java 
Card 2.2.2 platform. This section explains the details of this 
reference implementation. 
Client side of the protocol runs on a smart card specified 
above. Server side of the protocol is managed by a Java 
application. This application handles server-side calculations as 
well as creation of commands that are to be sent to the smart 
card. In this way, the exchange of messages between the client 
and the server is simulated locally. 
ECDH scheme is implemented by utilizing Java Card API's 
KeyAgreement class. The object from this class requires an 
ECPublicKey and an ECPrivateKey object to be initialized. As 
the mode of the key agreement scheme, ALG_EC_SVDP_DH 
is used. 
Although there are a number of recommended elliptic curve 
parameters, smart cards only allow implementation of a limited 
subset of curves with specific prime lengths. In our 
implementation, an elliptic curve with domain parameters 
recommended under the name secp192r1 [4] is constructed. To 
achieve this, keys are generated with LENGTH_EC_FP_192 
parameters. 
For symmetric encryption, AES with block size of 128 bit 
is selected. The mode of the encryption is ECB and input data 
is not being padded. For hash operations, both SHA-1 and 
SHA-256 are available. One of them can be chosen at the 
registration phase that is used for the entirety of the protocol. 
For taking the timings, we use SHA-256. 
To produce random challenge numbers, Java Card's 
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 object is initialized with 
ALG_SECURE_RANDOM  parameter. The random number 
generator in this mode produces cryptographically secure 
pseudo-random bit sequences. 
The timestamps are not included in this implementation, 
since the platform needs an external resource to tell the time. 
This may be solved by implementing internal counters 
synchronized at the registration phase. The values read from 
these counters may be substituted with the timestamps. 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section, we provide performance evaluation of the 
proposed protocol. We first give the timings of our reference 
implementation and then we compare our protocol with that of 
two other protocols in the literature.   
The computational timings of the protocol run are given 
Table 1 for the client side operations and in Table 2 for server 
side operations. The exact timings are given for each particular 
operation of login preparation and verification phases; timings 
of the enrollment phase are not considered since these 
operations are performed only once. The parameters used were 
given in Section IV. As the client side smart card, Feitian 
A22CR is used over Java Card 2.2.2. As the server, MacBook 
Pro, 2.5 GHz Intel Core i7 (OS X 10.11 El Capitan) is used. As 
seen in Table 1, the client side operations on the smart card 
takes almost 1.55 seconds, which is an acceptable delay for a 
smart card environment. After adding the server side delay, 
total computational delay of our proposed protocol becomes 
approximately 1.95 seconds. Such a delay is human-
imperceptible for a login experience.  
TABLE I.  CLIENT-SIDE TIMINGS 
Process Time (ms) 
creation of message 1 522 
secret key derivation, after msg. 2 753 
creation of message 3 26 
creation of message 5 152 
session key calculation, after msg. 6 98 
total 1551 
TABLE II.  SERVER-SIDE TIMINGS 
Process Time (ms) 
creation of message 2 388 
creation of message 4 15 
creation of message 6 1 
total 404 
 
We also compared the computational cost of login and 
verification phases of our protocol to other schemes [3, 5, 6], 
which uses elliptic curve cryptography, in Table 3.  
TABLE III.  COMPARISON OF COMPUTATIONAL COST 








hash 14 10 4 6 
EC point addition 2 4 2 0 
EC point 
multiplication 
3 14 7 4 
symmetric 
en/decryption 
1 4 4 8 
This comparison is performed using the major 
cryptographic functions' counts. As seen in Table 3, our 
protocol uses much less number of EC point multiplications 
when compared two of other protocols [5, 6] and just one more 
EC point multiplication as compared to one of the protocols 
[3]. Multiplication of two elliptic curve points is the costliest 
operation among other operations such as symmetric 
encryption, decryption and hashing. Therefore, we conclude 
our proposed protocol performs better than two of the other 
works and comparable to one of them. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We propose a two-factor remote authentication protocol 
that uses smart cards as what-you-have factor and a password 
as what-you-know factor. The proposed protocol is a robust 
one such that even if the smart card is captured and all the 
secrets stored in are revealed, the attacker cannot impersonate 
unless she know the password. Similarly, if the password is 
learnt by the attacker, she cannot launch any attack without 
possessing the smart card. More importantly, our protocol 
resists against smart offline dictionary attacks.  
We implemented our protocol using a commercially 
available smart card and obtained reasonable timings, proving 
that the proposed protocol can be used practically. Moreover, 
we compared our protocol with other smart card based 
protocols in the literature and showed the superiority of the 
proposed one to two of the rival protocols.  
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